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The paper argues that the Swedish ‘neo-liberal’ party (Moderaterna) has 
adapted its policies because of the popularity of the ‘universal’ Swedish welfare 
state. The party has come to accept that the modern welfare state is 
irreplaceable. 
We furthermore argue that the party’s moderate electoral platform in 2006 is 
earnest. In the “short run” the party can only hope to achieve incremental 
changes and it recognises this. Simultaneously however, the party in the “long 
run” wants to gradually change society. Over time the party in its rhetoric and 
ideological statements has emphasised the short and the long run differently. 
These differences between the ‘neo-liberal’ 1980s and 2006 should not conceal 
that the mechanism of welfare popularity largely remains the same. The party’s 




Artikeln argumenterar för att Moderaterna har anpassat sin politik som en 
följd av den ”universella” välfärdsstatens popularitet. Välfärdsstaten uppfattas 
som given. 
Vi menar vidare att förändringarna i partiets politiska plattform inför valet 
2006 huvudsakligen är att betrakta som uppriktiga. Man är väl medvetna om att 
man de närmaste åren endast kan hoppas på att kunna genomföra inkrementella 
förändringar. Samtidigt vill dock partiet – i ett längre tidsperspektiv – fortsatt 
gradvis förändra samhället. Partiet har i sin retorik betonat det kort- och 
långsiktiga perspektivet olika över tid. Dessa skillnader mellan det ”nyliberala” 
1980-talet och 2006 bör emellertid inte dölja att mekanismerna kring 
välfärdsstatens popularitet är de samma. Partiets motioner föreslår också endast 
inkrementella förändringar under båda tidsperioderna. 
  2The Swedish Conservative Party and the Welfare State: 
Institutional Change and Adapting Preferences 
 
1 Existing research on welfare reform 
In spite of predictions of the opposite, the evidence suggests that the welfare 
state is alive and kicking. There is a general agreement in the literature that 
fundamental transformation of an existing welfare state is uncommon. There 
have been incremental adjustments, but there is persisting institutional variation 
between countries (Kersbergen 2000, Pierson 1994, Kuhnle & Alestalo eds 
2000, Bonoli et al 2000, Pierson [ed] 2001, Ferrera & Rhodes [eds] 2000, Huber 
& Stephens 2001, Lindbom 2001). 
Furthermore, there is a general theoretical agreement regarding the 
importance of the existing organisation of the welfare state for which trajectory 
welfare reform takes. A residual welfare state discourages middle-class support 
of welfare whereas a universal welfare state on the other hand encourages it 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, Rothstein 1998, cf. Pierson 2001). This difference 
creates different political logics in the two systems. Swank (2003) finds support 
for these arguments in a quantitative analysis of expenditure in fifteen countries. 
What there is no agreement on is the importance of political partisanship for 
welfare reform. In this article, we will therefore focus on this issue. More 
specifically, we focus on if and how a universal welfare state structures the 
policy proposals of political parties. It is obviously less interesting to study the 
political left which is normally assumed to be inherently positive towards 
welfare state expansion. We instead analyse Sweden’s (most) neo-liberal party 
Moderaterna. Their role in welfare policy-making has not been studied much. 
The Swedish historian Torbjörn Nilsson argues that the internationally unique 
power of the labour movement in Sweden has made researchers focus on how 
this – and the characteristic welfare state – can be explained. He however also 
claims that this power position has influenced the dominating discourse 
  3regarding which questions and perspectives are possible to voice in societal 
debate (Nilsson 2002 p. 13, cf. Kersbergen 1995, Baldwin 1990).  
We in particular analyse the 1980s and the electoral campaign in 2006 that 
brought the bourgeois parties to power. 
 
2 The structural effects of existing welfare states on current politics 
During the last decades, the power resource approach has dominated welfare 
research. Simply put, it argues that a strong labour movement is a precondition 
for a strong welfare state (Korpi 1983). The ‘New politics’ approach however 
argues that the politics of welfare retrenchment is not the mirror of the politics 
of welfare expansion. Even in countries without strong labour movements – like 
USA or the United Kingdom – retrenchment is almost impossible. Conservative 
parties do not dare to retrench the welfare state in fear of electoral repercussions. 
New interests have arisen as the result of the welfare state and important parts of 
the electorate seriously object to fundamental change (Pierson 1994, 1996). This 
argument has been criticised on empirical grounds by researchers arguing that 
major retrenchment has occurred in the United Kingdom and/or USA (Alber 
1996, Korpi & Palme 2003). This is not the place to re-analyse the data, but 
obviously the major reason for the quarrel is that there is hardly ever clear 
criteria in the literature for when retrenchment has or has not occurred (cf. 
Lindbom 2001). 
Ross (2001) in a sense takes the ‘New politics’ argument even further: She 
argues that retrenchment is generally easier for leftist parties than for rightist 
parties. Voters trust that leftist parties do not make cutbacks for ideological 
reasons and therefore they give them more space to manoeuvre when they are in 
government.
1 Green-Pedersen (2002) presents empirical evidence for this 
argument in Denmark and the Netherlands and Balslev (2002) does the same for 
Sweden. 
  4With these contradicting theoretical effects in mind, it is not surprising that 
some quantitative analyses find no partisan effect on welfare expenditure in 
times of austerity (Swank 2001, Huber and Stephens 2001). Swank is 
nevertheless careful to point out that multi co-linearity for partisan variables are 
high in his study. The result should therefore be interpreted with caution, 
especially since other quantitative studies with a higher degree of precision in 
their measurement of the dependent variable do point to partisan effects (cf. 
Korpi and Palme 2003, Allen and Scruggs 2004). 
However, in order to take the argument that institutions matter seriously, we 
need to make separate analyses for the different ‘welfare regimes’. In universal 
welfare states, the political right is expected to behave differently than it does in 
liberal welfare states. Korpi and Palme (2003) analysis suggests that political 
partisanship remains important even when controlled for welfare regime, but we 
suggest that case studies do a better job if we want to study the importance of 
political partisanship. 
The statistical analyses of Korpi and Palme (2003) do not take into account 
that the Swedish bourgeois government’s cutbacks largely were legislated with 
the support of the Social Democratic opposition. When the Social Democrats got 
back in power, they moreover took formal replacement levels down to 75%, i.e. 
to a lower level than the bourgeois parties were able to/did. Last but not least, 
although varying replacement levels is a better measure of cutbacks than 
development in expenditures, large parts of the cutbacks are left out of their 
analysis. Balslev (2002) largely uses figures of cutbacks in budgetary legislation 
for twelve social policy programs and argues that the total sum of cutbacks 
implemented by the Social Democrats were larger than the ones by the 
bourgeois parties. 
To sum up, partisan effects are less straight-forward than the gist of the 
power-resource approach suggests. Bourgeois parties face structural inertia that 
makes it difficult for them to change an existing welfare state, particularly in 
  5universal welfare states. Our hypothesis is that Moderaterna’s proposals adapt to 
the existing structures (and their changes). 
 
3 Bourgeois parties in a universal welfare state 
To some extent, power resource-theory acknowledges that an existing welfare 
state conditions politics. The labour movement was the main force behind 
welfare state expansion, but once a universal welfare state is institutionalised, 
the middle-class has stakes in most welfare programs and these also have a high 
general level of legitimacy (Esping-Andersen 1990, Rothstein 1998). In order to 
win elections, the bourgeois parties are therefore expected to try to attract the 
support of the median voter, i.e. to adapt to welfare state popularity (cf. Korpi 
1981). This adaptation is however only strategic, their real preferences remain 
the same. Korpi (2005) makes clear that the power-resource theory is deductive 
when it comes to assigning preferences/interests to actors. 
However, we argue that the possibility that the change of preferences is ‘real’ 
cannot be ruled out. If such real adaptation in fact occurred, it would however be 
a mystery from a power resource perspective (Joakim Palme, personal 
communication). Which are the theoretical mechanisms that could lead to real 
ideological change? It is certainly a possibility that a given leadership 
reconsiders its policy positions. But in matters of high importance, it is perhaps 
more likely that change occurs with time. A ‘party’ is in fact an abstraction.  
At a given time, we should expect that there – within a party – exist a whole 
range of views on most topics. Therefore, firstly, a power-struggle may end with 
a different faction of the party coming to dominate. If this occurs after an 
election defeat due to unpopular reform proposals regarding the welfare state 
such change is endogenous to our theory. This type of change need not 
necessarily be stable. The next power struggle may bring a new leadership that 
restores ideology. 
  6Moreover, a party is not necessarily the same in the 1990s as in the 1890s just 
because there is a historical legacy. Therefore, secondly, over longer time-
periods, generational change may lead to changing views of what is ’natural’. 
For example, Moderaterna was generally hostile to public child care during the 
1960s (Hinnfors 1992), but the current leadership – born during the 1960s – put 
their own children in such institutions. Whereas it was considered unnatural to 
do so in the 1960s (a woman’s place was in the home), in the 2000s it is not (the 
wife of the party leader e.g. has a political career of her own). The party changed 
its position in the early 1970s, when the majority of families with small children 
consisted of two wage earners. From then on the party de-politicised the policy 
as such, but instead started to politicise the issue of private alternatives in 
supplying the service (Hinnfors 1992, p. 179). That is, certain parts of the 
ideology remain (largely) intact: The family is a central societal institution and 
the state should not intervene with how the husband and wife organise family 
life. Other parts of the ideology however change, i.e. the belief that child care 
institutions are bad for children. Ideological adjustment due to generational 
change is in its character more stable than leadership change caused by a power 
struggle. 
In both types of change, ideology probably changes in one respect but not in 
others. It is reasonable to make a distinction between the core system of values 
on the one hand and views regarding reality on the other (Tingsten 1941). 
Whereas the first largely tend to be highly stable, the latter are probably much 
more volatile. Even when real changes in core ideology occurs, it may well be 
the ranking of different preferences that changes rather than one value replacing 
another. 
An example of changing preferences is the supplementary pension. The 
bourgeois parties’ proposals in the 1950s argued that the state should only be 
responsible for providing a basic security for pensioners. However, after one of 
the greatest political conflicts in Sweden during the 20th century, the Social 
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benefits (ATP) as well prevailed. The bourgeois parties soon gave up their 
resistance to ATP (Uddhammar 1993). 
When a crisis faced the existing pension scheme in the late 20
th century, a 
broad political compromise – including the four bourgeois parties and the Social 
Democrats – on the future Swedish pension system was reached. By now, the 
existing pension system had matured and the bourgeois parties concluded that 
the double-payment problem made a switch from a pay-as-you-go system to a 
funded one politically impossible. The path-dependence of the existing welfare 
programme made Moderaterna change their policy preferences and act pro-
actively in favour of adjusting the existing pension scheme rather than changing 
it in a fundamental way (Lindbom 2001, Green Pedersen & Lindbom 2006). 
The point of the example is that the distinction between a ‘real change of 
preferences’ and ‘strategic change’ largely disappears in this context. The party 
adjusted to what is considered the best possible option in the existing context. 
We disagree with Korpi’s argument that we should understand preferences as 
exogenous and agree with the historical institutionalist scholar who argued that 
”Neither interests nor values have substantive meaning if abstracted from the 
institutional context in which humans define them” (Steinmo 1989, p. 502). 
 
4 Research design 
In order to establish how welfare state comprehensiveness affects resilience to 
welfare retrenchment we can either focus on citizens’ attitudes (cf. Albrekt 
Larsen, forthcoming) or on the behaviour and/or reasoning of the political elite. 
Since we particularly focus on the importance of political partisanship we 
naturally enough focus on parties. Moreover, whether or not citizens attitudes 
are conforming to the theoretical expectations (whether or not we have the 
methodological ability to discover this), if party elites believe they do (or not) is 
probably decisive for party behaviour.  
  8We make a case study of Moderaterna using primary material. Most of the 
existing research on Moderaterna tends to focus on party ideology as it is 
presented in the public debate and how it has varied over time. For our purposes, 
this material however tends to be too vague and abstract and we instead mostly 
rely on the party’s parliamentary proposals. But research on ideology helps us in 
choosing a time-period to study. The recurring description is that Moderaterna 
was relatively radical during the 1950s and 1980s, whereas the party moved 
towards the political centre during the 1960s and 1970s (Ljunggren 1992, 
Boreus 1994). Since a new party leader was elected in 2003 the party has yet 
again moved towards the middle. In order to study the influence of existing 
welfare structures on Moderaterna, we focus on the 1980s, the least likely time-
period to find support for the argument that the party has largely accepted the 
welfare state and on 2003-2006 when it is more likely that such evidence can be 
found. 
We analyse the sickness pay and the unemployment benefit.
2 Both are 
programs that supply the workforce with alternatives to selling their labour in 
the market and can therefore be expected to be the programs that are particularly 
targeted by neo-liberal cutbacks (Esping-Andersen 1990, Korpi & Palme 2003). 
When evaluating how radical the party policies are, we use the rules of the 
insurance schemes today as a guideline. If party proposals in the 1980s are as 
generous as the ones administered by the Social Democratic party – in power for 
twelve years – then surely they cannot be considered very radical. We moreover 
compare the proposals with the actual legislation implemented by the 
Conservative party in the United Kingdom. If Moderate policy proposals of the 
1980s are comparable to the policies in force in 2006 and if they are distinctly 
incremental in comparison with the legislation in the United Kingdom, then the 
hypothesis that a ‘universal’ welfare state makes a ‘neo-liberal’ party fairly 
moderate gains support. This obviously is a much tougher test than it would be 
  9to judge whether proposals match the key characteristics of a residual welfare 
state. 
The second case-study evaluates whether Sweden’s economic difficulties 
during the 1990s have changed the situation. The Social Democrats 
implemented certain cutbacks during their twelve years in power (1994-2006). If 
existing legislation determine what is possible for Moderaterna we should 
expect that their policy preferences have changed as the cutbacks opened new 
possibilities for Moderaterna in 2006. Simultaneously, the new party leadership 
is expected to acknowledge the structural limitations that the existing welfare 
state sets. 
 
5 Moderate proposals in the neo-liberal 1980s  
In Sweden, as well as in many other industrialised countries, neo-liberal ideas 
were introduced during the 1980s and it is often argued that these ideas came to 
dominate Moderaterna. Their party programme from 1984 was ”clearly 
characterised by the neo-liberal line of reasoning (Boreus 1994, p. 145/our 
translation). 
Indeed, in the party program from 1984 there are parts that easily can be 
interpreted as ideas about a residual welfare state: ”When the resources of the 
state and the local governments are scarce, it is important that the resources are 
directed to those who need them the most” (Moderaterna 1994, p. 35/our 
translation). Another example is the statement that: ”Social insurance should 
guarantee a basic security in cases of lost income and sickness” (Moderaterna 
1994, p. 53/our translation). It seems like earnings-related benefits are 
endangered, maybe to be replaced by private insurance, and as if income-tested 
programmes are to gain in importance. In order to get more solid evidence for an 
interpretation, we look at more detailed arguments of the party’s parliamentary 
proposals during the 1980s. They suggest that the party was not particularly 
radical.
3 For the sickness benefit for example, the proposal from 1984/85 argues 
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level as the scheme has in 2006. It can be added however, that the former Social 
Democratic government instructed the Swedish Social Insurance Agency to 
move clients that have been sick for more than six months from the sickness 
insurance to the early retirement program, i.e. lowering the replacement rate 
from 80% to 64% (Försäkringskassan 2006).
4
The big political debate in the 1980s was however focused on waiting days 
(cf. Svallfors 1989, 1996). At the time, the day of calling in your sickness was a 
waiting day. On top of that, the Moderate party proposed that for the first ten 
days of absence a particular year, the replacement rate should be only 60% 
(Motion 1984/85:2431). In today’s context, this does not sound very radical; 
after all, Moderaterna today proposes two waiting days. But in the context of the 
1980s, it was different. In the spring of 1988, the blue-collar union (LO) 
threatened with massive strikes and the employers association (SAF) accepted a 
wage-agreement that raised the actual (rather than legislated) replacement rate to 
100% during the first two weeks of absence (SvD, 9/5 2004). 
The party’s proposals regarding the unemployment benefit are more difficult 
to evaluate. The focus is on lowering the share of expenditure that is financed by 
the public from 95% to 80% and on establishing a compulsory unemployment 
insurance scheme (Motion 1984/95:900; 1987/88:Fi223). A few years later the 
implications were stated more clearly: During the first three months of 
unemployment the replacement rate was to be lowered from 90% to 80%. After 
that, the benefit level would return to 90% (Motion 1990/91:Fi217). Again, this 
proposal is rather generous since the formal replacement rate in 2006 is 80%. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the bourgeois government stated that it 
supported the universal welfare state when it gained power in 1991 (Rothstein 
1998). The parties, while still in opposition, had not offered a radically different 
alternative. They had instead centred on just how generous transfer payments 
should be (within a framework of income-security) and whether private 
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system with continued public financing (Ny start för Sverige 1991). 
In fact, the major share of the cutbacks in the transfers to households came 
under the social democratic government 1994-98 rather than the bourgeois 
government (1991-94) despite the crisis opening a window of opportunity 
(Balslev 2002). Moreover, a very considerable part of the cutbacks in 1991-94 
were made as a result of two broad agreements between the government and the 
Social Democratic opposition. These findings support the argument that only the 
Social Democrats have such a high degree of legitimacy when it comes to the 
welfare state that it can implement serious cutbacks (Green-Pedersen 2002). 
Cutbacks can be made when voters believe that they are economically necessary 
rather than ideologically motivated. Therefore, the framing of cutbacks is also 
important: there should be a just distribution of burdens. The Swedish Social 
Democrats therefore raised taxes to increase revenues to an extent that matched 
the decreased spending from cutbacks (Ringholm 1999). Since the Danish 
Social Democrats did not raise taxes in a similar way, such measures however 
do not seem to be necessary (Green-Pedersen, personal communication). 
The cutbacks implemented by the Social Democratic government 1994-98 
would probably not have been tolerated by the voters if it had been the 
bourgeois parties that had implemented them. After all, they probably chose to 
make the smaller cutbacks (with the co-operation with the Social Democrats) for 
a reason. This argument nicely illustrates the structural limitations that the 
existing welfare institutions create, in particular for bourgeois parties. 
However, these limitations – it could be argued – are universal, they are not 
limited to comprehensive welfare states as our theory argues that they are. In 
order to discuss this counter-argument a short analysis is made of social policy 
reform in the United Kingdom. In its rhetoric, Moderaterna sounded much like 
the Conservative party in the United Kingdom, but in this section we argue that 
the British Tories in practice went much further in its implemented policy 
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systematic attempt to explain the British case, instead the case is used as a 
contrast to highlight important features of the Swedish case. 
The idea of making a comparison between countries is to highlight how the 
opportunity structure varies. In certain contexts, other conservative parties can 
be more radical than the Swedish party can be. Since the central theoretical 
argument here is that welfare state organisation makes a difference, we 
obviously want to compare with a country from a different welfare regime. 
More specifically, we want to compare with a country that tends to have residual 
characteristics (Esping-Andersen 1990, Rothstein 1998). 
Out of these – mostly Anglo-Saxon – countries, many are federal, an attribute 
that Swank (2002) has shown can be very important for welfare state develop-
ment. The United Kingdom and Sweden are however very similar in being 
highly centralistic (Immergut 1992, Bonoli 2000). They are however different in 
terms of social corporatism and electoral systems. But unions used to be strong 
in Britain before Thatcher arrived. The electoral rules have been quite stable 
over time, but the Tories changed their welfare state agenda fairly dramatically 
with Thatcher. 
Obviously the majoritarian electoral system helped Thatcher to implement her 
policy reforms as we can see below. But electoral rules in themselves cannot 
explain why the Swedish Conservative party did not make more radical 
proposals. We argue that the difference between the two parties’ proposals can 
be explained by the different welfare state contexts in which they operated. 
Historically the contexts have shared many similarities, but the elements of 
earnings-relatedness of benefits became much stronger in Sweden than in 
Britain from the 1960s and onwards. Because of this, it is highly likely that the 
middle-class around 1980 had much higher stakes in the welfare state in Sweden 
than in United Kingdom (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990).  
  13In Sweden the earnings-related pension supplement (ATP) was introduced in 
1959, but in United Kingdom a similar scheme was introduced much later and 
never became as important. In 1980, the standard pension replacement level (for 
someone who had a ‘standard’ work history) was only 37,5% in Britain to be 
compared to 64,1% in Sweden. Similar differences existed in the sickness and 
unemployment benefits (Allen & Scruggs 2004). We should therefore expect 
that the middle-class in United Kingdom turns to private insurance to gain 
income-security to a larger extent than in Sweden. In fact, the ratio of private 
social expenditure to total social expenditure was much higher in United 
Kingdom in 1980 (10,24%) than in Sweden (4,01%) (Adema 1999).  
Another indicator of low middle-class stakes in the welfare state in Britain 
was the large share of income-tested programme expenditure of total 
expenditure on social security in 1980: 21,9% in Britain to be compared to 4,6% 
in Sweden (Gough, personal communication). All in all, data clearly shows that 
the welfare state found in United Kingdom was relatively residual whereas the 
one in Sweden was relatively universal (and earnings-related). According to 
Rothstein (1998), it is therefore highly likely that the middle-class found the 
welfare state in Britain lacking in substantive and procedural justice as well as in 
the sense of everyone paying their share of the burden. 
During the last couple of decades we have seen fairly radical retrenchment in 
United Kingdom. For example, the earnings-related part of the unemployment 
benefit was removed. The maximum duration of the benefit was cut from 12 
months to six months. The result of these and other changes has been a dramatic 
increase in the relative role of means-tested support for the unemployed (Bonoli 
et al 2000 p. 42, Woods 2001). 
The British pension system has also been changed radically. The value of the 
basic pension in relation to an average income has decreased. The benefit 
formula of the earnings-related pension system (SERPS) was changed and 
employees were allowed to opt out of the system. The overall result has been a 
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importance of private insurance (Bonoli et al 2000, p. 31). 
The sickness benefit has been privatised and is provided entirely by 
employers, subject only to minimum rates set by the state. The state used to fund 
the system (90%), but no longer does so. The benefit has the same nominal 
value for all employees. The standard rate of sick pay represents a 43% 
replacement rate for an employee earning the national minimum wage and 
working 35 hours a week, i.e. a very low replacement rate in comparison to 
Sweden (Barmby et al, 2004, cf. Pierson 1996). 
In Great Britain we therefore find fairly strong changes of the existing welfare 
states in the direction of a more ’liberal’ one. We see an increased importance of 
means-tested benefits as well as of private social insurance. The Swedish ‘neo-
liberal’ party never proposed anything nearly as radical as this. 
The exception that proves the rule is health care. The Conservatives 
repeatedly backed off from plans to fundamentally restructure the system since 
these provoked a public outrage. By the end of the 1980s, the government's 
repeated promise had become ”the NHS is safe with us” (Pierson 1996). Co-
payment for health care has still not been implemented, unlike in Sweden where 
it has been around for a long time. The – universal – NHS was the most popular 
element of the British welfare state (Giamo 2001) and this seems to have 
stopped fundamental changes but not internal-market reforms similar to the 
Swedish ones. 
* * * 
To sum up, Moderaterna was not very neo-liberal in comparison to its British 
counterpart. And furthermore, even the policies of the former Social Democratic 
government go further than the ‘neo-liberal’ party’s proposals of the 1980s. 
Therefore the hypothesis that a ’universal’ welfare state heavily influences the 
policy positions of bourgeois parties receives strong support even when tested in 
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during its most neo-liberal time-period. 
 
6 The ‘new’ and more Moderate party 
After the debacle of the election in 2002, when Moderaterna received only 
15,2% of the votes to be compared with 22,9% in 1998, the new leadership re-
evaluated its old proposals. The new party leadership came to the conclusion 
that “the doubts of many voters that Moderaternas proposals for tax cuts were 
compatible with a sound state of the public finances was one reason that the 
party lost voters in the election in 2002” (Reinfeldt et al 2004/translation by the 
authors). The reference to voters’ preferences or perceptions is explicit, the link 
to the welfare state that those taxes finance is implicit. As a consequence of this 
analysis, the party has changed its core policy: the one of tax cuts. Promises of 
future tax cuts have been reduced dramatically. 
In a speech to the party congress in the autumn 2005, Reinfeldt puts a heavy 
emphasis on making policies trust-worthy. Policy reform has to be possible to 
implement, trust-worthy and appear to be ‘safe’ to the electorate. Or as he puts it 
in a memorable phrase: “I didn’t become a Conservative because I believed in 
the idea of the Revolution” (Reinfeld 2005, p. 2). The new party leader wants to 
be seen as pragmatic and in favour of gradual change. 
Tax cuts have not only been diminished, but also been re-targeted towards 
people with fairly low wages. Moreover, the proposed cuts of subsidies to local 
governments have also been reduced, since they might affect the quality of 
education and health care etc that local governments are responsible for. The 
quality of these services has been at the forefront of the last three elections in 
Sweden including the one in 2006. It is clear that most voters want public 
spending to increase – not decrease – in these areas (Svallfors 1996, 2004, DN 
30/6 2006). 
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dramatically during the last few years. In the public debate there has been a 
discussion whether the change is for real or whether it is only the presentation of 
the party that has changed. It however seems that everyone agrees that the 
proposals are ‘soft’ compared to party proposals from the 1980s and 1990s. The 
editorial page of the major Swedish newspaper (Dagens Nyheter [DN]), 
traditionally social liberal, has criticised Moderaterna making the bourgeois 
alternative almost indistinguishable from the Social Democrats (cf. Wiklund 
2006, pp. 233-36). 
If we focus on the welfare state, it is hard to understand why. Today cutbacks 
focus on transfers to households rather than (indirectly on) services. But the 
party is for example proposing cutbacks in the replacement rates of the 
unemployment benefit from 80% to 70% after the first 200 days of 
unemployment and to 65% after 300 days. In the sickness insurance, the party 
wants to introduce a second waiting day and possibly reduce the replacement 
rate from today’s 80% to 70% after six months absence (www.moderat.se). 
Obviously, this is far more radical than the ‘radical’ proposals of the neo-liberal 
era of the 1980s that often were generous even compared to the current systems 
in 2006 (see above). 
Why then are Moderaterna able to get away with, relatively speaking, radical 
proposals and still be described as relatively ‘soft’? New possibilities to propose 
cutbacks have opened as the Social Democrats have implemented cutbacks. It is 
more difficult for the SAP to convincingly argue that the mentioned proposals 
will dismantle the Swedish welfare state as they themselves lowered the 
replacement rates of the social insurance schemes to 75% in 1996. In particular 
it is difficult for the Social Democrats to criticise cutbacks in the sickness 
benefit. 
Another major reason that the party today is seen as ‘softer’ than earlier is that 
it no longer seeks direct confrontation with Sweden’s largest union, LO, the 
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Swedish labour market is functioning well if evaluated from a pragmatic 
starting-point and in terms of effects. In the 1980s and 1990s, the party instead 
analysed the labour market from a theoretical starting-point: a neo-
classical/monetarist micro-economic analysis of the institutions (interview 
Borg). 
The welfare state expansion during the 1950s and 1960s often put 
Moderaterna in a situation where it had to accept welfare expansion once it had 
been implemented. In the 2000s, the party finds new opportunities because of 
the cutbacks that were implemented by the Social Democrats. The party has to 
stay away from radical rhetoric similar to the one of the 1980s, but as long as it 
does the party is much more difficult for the Social Democrats to attack than it 
used to be. 
Another indication of the restrictions that the existing welfare state poses for 
Moderaterna is the statement of the party’s chief economist (now Minister of 
Finance): “All proposals should be possible to implement during the first 
hundred days after a bourgeois government takes power” (interview Borg/our 
translation). In reality this means that only incremental reforms are possible. 
The parliamentary majority is in control of the Royal Commission institute, i.e. 
of the capacity to study the potential problems new legislation might face, e.g. 
existing legislation and perverse effects. But if a new bourgeois government 
wants to go into the election campaign 2010 with a record of successfully 
implemented reforms, it cannot await the results of commissions, it needs to act 
directly during its first couple of months in power. The consequence however is 
that proposals need to take existing arrangements as its’ starting point and 
suggest incremental reform. 
In many ways, this seems to be one of the major differences between 
Moderaterna today and the party during the 1990s. The party, at least in its more 
ideological statements, used to take a very theoretical starting point (cf. Barrling 
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economic theory suggest?” This way of thinking starts from a tabula rasa and 
constructs an ‘ideal’ system (irrespective of empirical context). According to 
Borg, the party today starts from what it conceives to be problematic with the 
actual situation in Sweden and tries to ‘patch’ one problem after the other 
(piece-mal engineering). Faith in theoretical models is much smaller than it was 
around 1990 when the party included expected dynamic effects of tax cuts and 
productivity gains from private competition in the production of welfare services 
in its budget proposals (interview Borg). 
But apart from that, there are some indications that the new leadership does 
not want to change the existing welfare state in a fundamental way (i.e. towards 
a more liberal welfare state with more means-testing and private insurance 
schemes). In the interview, Borg explicitly denounces an expansion of means-
tested benefits on the grounds of their tendency to create poverty-traps. The 
ambition is to increase the incentives to work and means-tested benefits are not 
helpful in this regard. Regarding private-insurance he goes as far as suggesting 
legislation to stop private/occupational insurance from reducing self-risks, e.g. 
private insurance that compensates for waiting days in the public scheme. The 
political conflict with the Social Democrats regarding the social insurance is not 
really about the fundamentals like ‘universalism’, but is rather on how big the 
self-risk should be for the insured. Moderaterna wants to increase the – or as 
they see it rather create a – difference between income from working and living 
on a benefit, particularly for low-income workers. Both their tax-cuts and their 
cutbacks have this profile (interview Borg). If their analysis is correct and these 
reforms will in fact increase employment, the effect on the budget is two-fold: 
tax-income will rise and social expenditure will decrease and this just in time for 
the next election campaign. 
To sum up, there are strong indications that Moderaterna in 2006 
acknowledges structural limitations to welfare reform. Voters did not find 
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could be implemented without serious repercussions on health care and schools. 
The party has therefore adjusted its policies accordingly. Furthermore, now that 
the election in 2006 has been won, the party needs its proposals to be 
implemented very soon in order to have a chance to win the election in 2010. 
This by necessity means that reform proposals are incremental rather than 
fundamental. But it is also questionable that the party – at least in the short run – 
wants to make fundamental reform. The focus is on lowering replacement rates, 
not on means-testing benefits or on replacing social insurance with private 
insurance. 
The new party leader explicitly denounces suggestions that the new policies 
were inspired by international examples and points to the party’s own 
ideological history as the inspiration (Reinfeldt 2005). It is difficult to know 
how much weight to give this statement. The speech at the party congress is 
largely a defence of the changes to meet potential critique from party activists 
and giving reference to the party’s history nicely fits that objective. It would also 
be surprising if the new leadership did not analyse the electoral success of the 
Danish ‘neo-liberal’ party (Venstre). When the communications manager 
mentions “tax-stop” (skattestopp) in an interview, it also suggests that this 
influence exists, since this has been the Danish buzzword, but is a foreign word 
to the Swedish debate (Schlingmann in Wiklund 2006). This mechanism where 
the popularity of the ‘universal’ welfare state creates a pressure on Conservative 
parties to promise that the welfare state is safe in their hands should be expected 
to be important in all the Scandinavian countries and probably in many of the 
Continental countries as well. 
The political implication of our analysis is that the resilience of the 
comprehensive welfare state is even stronger than the power-resource approach 
suggests. The Swedish ‘neo-liberal’ party has a restricted room of manoeuvre. 
However, that said it also needs to be added that there seems to be a political 
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over. If the political right has come to the conclusion that the welfare state 
cannot be dismantled, the political left also is puzzling on how to finance the 
existing obligations rather than looking for new social problems that the public 
sector should solve (SOU 2003:123). During the electoral campaign in 2006, 
these issues were not very prominent on the political agenda, but they will return 
once the election is over. The ageing population points to a future of permanent 
austerity for the welfare state. 
 
8 Conclusion 
This article addresses the debate in welfare research regarding the importance 
of political partisanship. We argue that the importance has declined in the 
context of ‘universal’ welfare states. There are strong theoretical reasons to 
believe that bourgeois parties’ preferences have changed over time as the 
preferences of important segments of the electorate changed. Our study of the 
proposals made by Moderaterna regarding the sickness and unemployment 
benefit clearly shows an acceptance of the principle that the benefits should be 
earnings-related, but there is a remaining conflict with the Social Democrats 
regarding the replacement levels. 
We offer a more incrementalist understanding of politics than the power-
resource approach, but this does not mean that politics becomes unimportant. 
Even if bourgeois parties adapt to changing policy structures, this does not 
necessarily imply that there is no conflict regarding the welfare state. There are 
probably always incremental conflicts, but the bulk of the ‘universal’ welfare 
state is beyond being questioned. If the argument is correct, then universal 
welfare states are even more stable than the power-resource thesis argues that 
they are (cf. Pierson 1994). 
Our empirical findings do not confirm the stereotype that all Conservative 
parties inherently are more or less masked versions of Margaret Thatcher. The 
  21comparison between the policy proposals of Moderaterna and the implemented 
legislation of the Conservative party in the United Kingdom during the 80s 
clearly shows this. What we instead find is a party with neo-liberal ideals that 
finds it very hard to translate its abstract ideology into actual policy proposals. 
Earlier analyses of the party’s ideology have tended to overestimate the 
importance of neo-liberal ideology because of over-interpreting general and 
abstract statements in the party programme and/or because accepting the terms 
used by the political discussants of the time. The political conflict in Sweden has 
focused on replacement levels and on whether or not to allow private 
competition in producing welfare services; not on propositions fundamentally 
changing the welfare state. 
Our results confirm the hypothesis that a welfare state affects the policy 
positions of the political actors. Moderaterna clearly adapted its proposals in 
order to win the election in 2006. At the same time, the party is able to “get 
away with” policy proposals more radical than it made during the ‘neo-liberal’ 
1980s when its policy proposals actually were rather soft by today’s standards. 
The policy context today is different from then because of the Social Democratic 
cutbacks of the 1990s. 
Are the changes of the political platform for the election in 2006 earnest? Our 
answer/s is that: 1) yes, in the “short run” the party can only hope to achieve 
incremental changes and it recognizes this, but also that 2) no, in the “long run” 
the party does want to (gradually) change society. The latter does however not 
seem to imply a residual welfare state, but definitely an effort to lower taxes. 
Over time the party in its rhetoric and ideological statements has emphasized 
points 1 and 2 differently. These differences between the 1980s and 2006 should 
not conceal that the mechanism of welfare popularity largely remains the same. 
When it comes to actual policy proposals we therefore tend to find incremental 
changes only. 
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institutions should not be taken too far. As already Pierson (1994) stressed, there 
is the possibility of blame-avoiding reforms and of ‘systemic’ reform. The 
former type is incremental, but the latter attempts to weaken the welfare states 
political support and therefore to open future opportunities to make welfare 
reform. An argument can be made that the current government’s changes of the 
unemployment benefit has exactly this character: 1) The decreased subsidies of 
the benefit makes it more expensive and may therefore lower incentives to be 
members of the scheme and/or of unions. 2) Reducing the maximum benefit 
may decrease the middle-class’ interest in the public scheme and make it more 
vulnerable in the future. Another explanation is however also quite plausible: 
The government needs to finance its tax-cuts and it uses methods to decrease 
spending that the Social Democratic governments before it used as well 
(Anderson 2001, Lindbom 2005). The two explanations are in fact not 
exclusionary, it is rather plausible that the bourgeois government needs to 
collect the money and that it found this way of doing so particularly enticing. 
The ‘universal’ welfare state is highly resilient to fundamental change in the 
foreseeable future. In the long run more dramatic changes may occur. But just as 
it took decades to build the current welfare state, it will probably take decades to 




                                                 
1 Kitschelt (2001) argues that it is not the strength of social democratic parties per se that 
impedes social policy retrenchment, but a situation where competition is situated primarily on 
a socio-cultural dimension and when all major parties are credible defenders of the welfare 
state, e.g. Germany. 
2 The unemployment level was much lower in the 1980s than in 2006 and therefore it can be 
argued that the problem pressure was much lower. A highly ideological neo-liberal party 
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should not need such excuses to make cutbacks though. And in the sickness benefit, there was 
a significant pressure already in the 1980s (Försäkringskassornas Riksförbund, 2004, s. 68). 
3 There were fairly big ideological differences within the party. In the late 1980s, radical 
forces within the party (mainly the youth organization) wanted to dissolve the universal health 
insurance, but the majority within the party supported the existing ‘solidaristic’ financing of 
the scheme (Nilsson 2003, p. 66 f.). 
4 A few years later the Moderate party had adjusted its proposal slightly. The replacement rate 
would be 80% the first three months of sickness absence, then it would be raised to 90% 
(Motion 1987/88: Fi223). This clearly is generous compared to the system in place in 2006. 
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